Metaethics
The systematic philosophical investigation of the language and logical relations within Normative Ethical systems.
Those who investigate 'Metaethics' divide into two generally recognized groups:
1) Cognitivists and 2) Non-Cognitivists. The Cognitivists argue that moral language
is semantically rich (i.e., meaningful), although there is disagreement as to what meaning moral designators
convey. Natrualists maintain that moral designators point to some natural property of the world
(e.g., pleasure or pain). The consequence of this view is that moral propositions can be translated into
empirical propositions (e.g., "Lying is wrong," translates into something like, "Lying causes pain.").
Nonnaturalists like G.E. Moore, on the other hand, maintain that normative language
signifies some set of basic non-natural properties (e.g., Goodness, Rightness, etc.) which cannot be reduced
to any simpler notions. In order to understand moral language, therefore, we must exercise our moral intuition,
or rely on some special enlightenment or revelation.
Unlike the Cognitivists, the Non-Cognitivists are committed to the view that moral language is essentially
meaningless. That is, moral designators convey no cognitive content at all; they neither refer to natural or non-natural
properties. Non-Cognitivists tend to fall into one of two camps: 1) Emotivism or Prescriptivism.
Emotivists, Like A.J. Ayer, hold that moral language is an example of performative language, a kind of verbal punctuation. On this view,
the purpose of a moral proposition is to express one's emotional response to some action or behavior and/or attempt to
cause a similar reaction in others. Prescriptivists like R.M. Hare, hold the view that moral language is really just a from of
imperative. Moral assertions, on this view, are reducible to the claim "Don't do that!"