Those who investigate 'Metaethics' divide into two generally recognized groups:
Nonnaturalists like G.E. Moore, on the other hand, maintain that normative language signifies some set of basic non-natural properties (e.g., Goodness, Rightness, etc.) which cannot be reduced to any simpler notions. In order to understand moral language, therefore, we must exercise our moral intuition, or rely on some special source of enlightenment perhaps even divine revelation.
Unlike the Cognitivists, Non-Cognitivists are committed to the view that moral language is literally meaningless. That is, moral designators convey no cognitive content at all; they neither refer to natural or non-natural properties in the world. Non-Cognitivists tend to fall into one of two camps:
Emotivists, Like A.J. Ayer, hold that moral language is an example of performative language, and functions like a kind of verbal punctuation. On this view, the purpose of a moral proposition is to express one's emotional response to some action or behavior and/or attempt to cause a similar reaction in others. Prescriptivists like R.M. Hare, hold the view that moral language is really just a from of imperative. Moral assertions, on this view, are reducible to the claim "Don't do that!"