PHI 201 - Unit 2
Sokrates

The Problem of Piety
I. Cultural Background:

A. The Nature of Virtue (arete - ἀρετή) -

1. The Cardinal Virtues -
   a. **Courage** (andreia - ἀνδρεία, agenoria ἀγηνορία)
   b. **Justice** (dikausene - δικαιοσύνη)
   c. **Temperance** (sophrosune - σωφροσύνη)
   d. **Wisdom** (sophia - σοφία)
   e. **Piety** (hosios - ὁσιος)

2. How does one acquire virtue?

B. Religion and Virtue:

1. Filial Piety - obligation to family
2. Religious Piety - obligation to the gods
II. Introduction:

A. Meeting at the court (the *Arxon Basileus*)

B. The charge against Sokrates

C. Euthuphro’s Case:
   1. Prosecuting his father for murder
   2. Filial piety versus civic obligation
   3. Euthuphro’s knowledge of divine piety and impiety (*theion hosion/anosian θείον ὀσίον/ἀνοσίον*)
   4. Euthuphro to become Sokrates’ teacher
III. Euthuphro on Piety:

A. First Definition 5d: “what’s pious is precisely what I’m doing now”

1. Zeus (“the just”) shackled his father (6a)
2. Kronos gelded his father
3. These sons were right (pious) to punish their wicked fathers
4. Therefore, I’m pious for prosecuting my father.

B. Sokrates’ Objections:

1. S. doubts the Hesiadic myths
2. Examples versus $f$-ness (i.e., a definition)

NOTE - there is one thing ($f$-ness) to be found in all acts that are holy and/or unholy. 6e
C. Second Definition 7a: “what’s loved by the gods is pious...”

D. Sokrates’ Objections:
   1. piety and impiety are opposites
   2. the gods disagree with each other
   3. thus, the gods disagree about which things are pious
   4. thus, the same things is both pious and impious

E. Third Definition 9a: piety is “what all the gods love...”
Sokrates On Piety

C. **Second Definition 7a**: “what’s loved by the gods is pious...”

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   1. piety and impiety are opposites
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E. **Third Definition 9a**: piety is “what *all* the gods love...”

**Euthupho’s Dilemma** - “is the pious loved by the gods because it’s pious? Or is it pious because it’s loved? 10a
Euthuphro’s Dilemma:

“Is something pious because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is pious?

1) If the gods love $x$, then $x$ is pious.
   (gods’ desire $\rightarrow$ rightness)

OR

2) If $x$ is pious, then the gods love $x$.
   (rightness $\rightarrow$ gods’ desire)
G. The Implications of Euthuphro’s Dilemma -

- Assume $x$ is pious because the gods love it:
  - Is there a reason/cause for their love?
    - If no the gods are arbitrary …
      - anything could be good/bad, or
      - the same thing could be both good/bad
    - If yes, then that is the cause of its being loved (not the fact that the gods love it)

- Assume the gods love $x$ because it is pious (then piety is what causes the gods’ love, but we still don’t know what piety is)
  - Being loved by the gods is a property of piety, not piety itself.
IV. Sokrates Attempts to help Euthuphro -

A. What is the *relationship* between Piety and Justice?
   1. Piety = Justice
   2. Piety > Justice
   3. Justice > Piety

B. Piety is the part of Justice that *cares for* the gods.

C. What kind of *care* (*therapeia*) do we give the gods?
   1. Beneficial -
      a. Horseman
      b. Huntsman
      c. Herdsman
   2. Assistive - slave to master
D. Fourth Definition 12e: “piety is a part of justice...”

E. Piety, Justice, and Virtue:

1. if piety and justice are not identical, then
2. piety is a part of justice.
3. if piety is the part of justice “tending” to the gods (12e), then
4. piety is a kind of service to the gods (13d)
5. the service is aimed at pleasing the gods (14b), then
6. piety is what is pleasing to the gods (which has already been shown to be the wrong answer, hence they must start again)